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In the wake of the 1997-98 financial crises, interest rates in Asia were raised immediately, and then
reduced sharply. We describe an environment in which this is the optimal monetary policy. The optimality
of the immediate rise in the interest rate is an example of the theory of the second best: although high
interest rates introduce an inefficiency wedge into the labor market, they are nevertheless welfare improving
because they mitigate distortions due to binding collateral constraints. Over time, as various real frictions
wear off and the collateral constraint is less binding, the familiar Friedman forces dominate, and interest
rates are optimally set as low as possible.
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The Asian ﬁnancial crises of 1997-98 triggered a sharp debate over the appropriate response
of policy to a ﬁnancial crisis. The hallmark of the crises was a “sudden stop” (Calvo, 1998):
capital inﬂows turned into outﬂows and output suddenly collapsed. Some argued, appealing to
the traditional monetary transmission mechanism, that a cut in the interest rate was required
to slow or reverse the drop in output. Others argued that because of currency mismatches in
balance sheets, the exchange rate depreciation associated with a cut in the interest rate might
exacerbate the crisis. They argued for an increase in interest rates. Interestingly, a look at
the data indicates that both pieces of advice were followed in practice. Figure 1 shows what
happened to short term interest rates in each of four Asian crisis countries. Initially they rose
sharply. Within six months or so, the policy was reversed and interest rates were ultimately
driven to below their pre-crisis levels. A casual observer might infer that policy was simply
erratic, with policymakers trying out diﬀerent advice at diﬀerent times.
In this paper, we argue that the observed policy may have served a single coherent purpose.
We describe a model in which the optimal response to a ﬁn a n c i a lc r i s i si sa ni n i t i a ls h a r pr i s e
in the interest rate, followed by a fall to below pre-crisis levels.
In our model, because of the presence of real frictions, resources are slow to respond in the
immediate aftermath of a shock. Over time, resource allocation becomes more ﬂexible.1 We
characterize a ﬁnancial crisis as a shock in which collateral constraints unexpectedly bind and
are expected to remain in place permanently. Our model has the property that when there is
a binding collateral constraint and real frictions hinder resource allocation, then the monetary
transmission mechanism is the reverse of what it would otherwise be. In particular, a rise in the
interest rate increases economic activity and welfare. Over time, as the real frictions wear oﬀ,
the monetary transmission mechanism corresponds to the traditional one in which low interest
rates stimulate output and raise welfare.
We now brieﬂye x p l a i nt h er e a la n dﬁnancial frictions in the model, and describe how they
shape optimal policy in the wake of a ﬁnancial crisis. We adopt a small, tradable/non-tradable
goods open economy model. The real friction is that labor in the tradeable sector is chosen
prior to the realization of the current period shock.2 Thus, when the ﬁnancial shock occurs, the
allocation of labor to the tradeable sector cannot respond in the current period, although it can
respond in subsequent periods.
We adopt two forms of ﬁnancial friction.3 First, to capture the non-neutrality of money our
1In eﬀect, we combine into one model, the two studied in Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2004). In one model
of that paper, labor in the traded good sector was ﬁxed in each period. In another model, labor was completely
ﬂexible.
2A similar friction is used by Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2001) to study the role of capital ﬂows
following Spain’s entry to the European Community.
3Other studies have examined the relationship between optimal interest rates and ﬁnancial crises. Aghion,
2model incorporates the portfolio allocation friction in the limited participation model.4 In the
absence of collateral constraints, our model reproduces the traditional monetary transmission
mechanism: when the domestic monetary authority expands the money supply, the liquidity of
the banking system increases and interest rates fall, leading to an expansion in output and a de-
preciation of the exchange rate. Second, our model assumes ﬁrms make use of labor and a foreign
intermediate input, and that these must be ﬁnanced in advance. The collateral constraint that
is imposed during the crisis applies to these loans. Our collateral constraint captures the balance
sheet mismatch problems often emphasized in the context of currency crises, because liabilities
are denominated in foreign currency while assets are denominated in domestic currency.5
The surprising feature of optimal policy in our model is that the nominal interest rate rises
sharply in the period of the collateral shock. That this is optimal is a consequence of the
interaction of the ﬁnancial and real frictions. A rise in the interest rate acts like a tax on the
employment of labor in the nontraded good sector, and raises the marginal cost of production in
that sector. Other things the same, this slows down economic activity. However, when collateral
constraints are binding, there is another eﬀect that dominates. Because the employment of labor
by ﬁrms in the traded sector is predetermined in the period of the shock, the interest rate rise
does not increase the marginal cost of production in that sector. With the marginal cost of non-
traded goods rising relative to the marginal cost of traded goods, the relative price of nontraded
goods increases. Other things the same, this increase raises the traded-good value of the physical
capital stock in the non-traded sector. Because this capital is used as collateral in the import of
intermediate goods, the collateral constraint is relaxed. Imports of intermediate goods increase
and the production of tradeable goods expands. Because tradeable and non-tradeable goods
are complements in domestic production, the demand for non-tradables increases and overall
economic activity expands. Welfare is increased by the high interest rate, despite the fact that
it introduces a distortionary wedge in the labor market. The reason welfare increases is that
the policy has the eﬀect of sharply reducing another wedge, the one that is associated with the
Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) present a model with multiple equilibria, in which a currency crisis is the bad
equilibrium. The possibility of the bad equilibrium is the outcome of the interplay between credit constraints
on private ﬁrms and nominal price rigidities. The authors show that the monetary authority should tighten
monetary policy after any shock that results in the possibility of the currency crisis equilibrium. Our analysis
diﬀers from this analysis in three ways. First, equilibrium multiplicity plays no role in this paper. Second, our
model emphasizes a diﬀerent set of rigidities. Third, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee focus on the prevention
of crises, while we focus on their management after they occur. Similarly, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002)
show that when the economy faces a binding international collateral constraint, a monetary expansion that
would redistribute funds from consumers to distressed ﬁrms has no real eﬀects. Given this lack of eﬀectiveness,
a monetary authority that trades-oﬀ output and an inﬂation target focuses on the latter and tightens monetary
policy to achieve the inﬂation objective.
4For closed economy analyses of this model, see Lucas 1990, Fuerst 1992, Christiano 1991, Christiano and
Eichenbaum, 1992, 1995.
5The relevance of balance sheet eﬀects during sudden stops for emerging markets—but not for developed
countries—is documented in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004).
3collateral constraint.
The mechanism by which the higher interest rate produces higher output is novel, and so
to further highlight its workings, we construct and analyze a simple example.6 The example
represents a dramatic simpliﬁcation of our dynamic model. There is no money, and there is only
one period. In the example, a tax rate on labor plays the role of the interest rate in our dynamic,
monetary model. We are able to prove that whenever the collateral constraint is binding and
the equilibrium is unique, a rise in the labor tax rate must stimulate output, consumption,
employment and welfare. This result may be of interest beyond the sudden stop episodes that
we study here. In particular, it may be useful for shedding light on the empirical literature on
the “non-Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy” or “Expansionary Fiscal Consolidations”. We return
to this issue in our concluding remarks.
We now brieﬂy discuss the interaction of monetary policy and sudden stop in our model.
The sudden stop is triggered by a tightening of collateral constraints. The eﬀect of the collateral
shock is to increase the shadow cost of foreign borrowing, since international debt limits - via the
collateral constraint - the ability of ﬁrms to purchase foreign intermediate inputs. As a result,
imports of intermediate inputs drop and, because they are crucial for domestic production, the
latter falls. In addition, the sharp rise in the shadow cost of debt induces agents to pay down
that debt by running a current account surplus. This process continues until the debt falls to
the point where the collateral constraint is non-binding and the economy is in a new steady
state. Monetary policy has no impact on how much collateral lenders require, nor does it have
an important impact on real variables in the new steady state. Monetary policy aﬀects real
variables and welfare primarily by its impact on the nature of the transition from the old to the
new steady state. The sharp rise in the interest rate in the immediate aftermath of the crisis has
the eﬀect of resisting (not reversing) the fall in nominal and real exchange rates, asset prices,
output, employment and consumption, caused by the initial "sudden stop".
6There exist other examples in the literature of how ﬁnancial frictions may have the consequence that a
high interest rate is desirable. For example, Kocherlakota (2002, 2003) shows that a high interest rate may
be part of a socially eﬃcient mechanism to help individuals smooth consumption intertemporally, in the face
of binding borrowing constraints. In private communication, Kocherlakota has provided us with a very simple
example that illustrates the point. Consider a two period economy, in which 1/2 the population (‘borrowers’)
has a sequence of endowments, yL in the ﬁrst period and yH in the second period, where yL <y H. Suppose
the other half of the population (‘lenders’) has the opposite lifetime sequence of endownments, yH, yL. Suppose
everyone has the same utility function, u(c1)+u(c2), where u is strictly concave and c1 and c2 are periods 1
and 2 consumption, respectively. Suppose also that borrowing is not permitted. Then the unique equilibrium is
that everyone consumes their endowment. The borrowers are forced to do so by the non-negativity constraint on
private bonds, and the lenders are prevented from lending by a very low interest rate, R = u0(yH)/u0 ¡
yL¢
. An
optimal policy is for the government to issue bonds in the ﬁrst period, and redistribute the proceeds to everyone
(suppose the government cannot see who is constrained and who is not) in lump sum form. In the second period,
the government taxes everyone in order to pay back the bonds. This policy in eﬀect allows borrowers and lenders
to exchange amongst themselves. A side eﬀect of this policy is that the interest rate is lower. Although this
example has some of the ﬂavor of our analysis (optimal policy under binding ﬁnancial constraints is associated
with a high interest rate), in its details it is very diﬀerent.
4We compare the dynamic behavior of the variables in the model with data drawn from the
Korean crisis experience. Qualitatively, the model reproduces the Korean experience reasonably
well. In particular, the model reproduces the observed transitory rise in the current account, and
fall of real quantities such as employment, consumption and output. The model also captures
the evolution of asset prices, the real and nominal exchange rate and the behavior of the interest
rate. Taken together, this evidence suggests that our model may provide a useful interpretation
of the apparently erratic behavior of monetary policy exhibited in Figure 1.
The model does have quantitative empirical shortcomings. Although it captures the direction
of movement in the current account, it understates the magnitude. We suspect that this reﬂects
the absence of physical investment in the model. A reduction in investment provides agents with
another margin from which to draw resources that can be used to pay oﬀ the international debt.
Also, though the inﬂation response of the model to the ﬁnancial shock matches qualitatively, it
misses on magnitude.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we provide empirical evidence to support the main
assumptions of the model. In particular, we show that collateral constraints were increased
during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, and that it is not unreasonable to assume that at least a
fraction of the assets used in the nontradable sector could be used to secure foreign borrowing
by tradable sector ﬁrms. We also show that imported intermediate inputs are a large fraction of
imports, and that they fell sharply during the crisis. Second, we present the simpliﬁed example
discussed above. The third section presents our dynamic, monetary model. Section 4 discusses
model calibration and section 5 present our simulation results. Second 6 concludes.
2. Evidence on Key Assumptions
This section discusses empirical evidence related to key features of our model. We begin by
displaying evidence that collateral requirements play a role in emerging markets generally, as
well as evidence that collateral constraints tightened at the onset of the Asian ﬁnancial crises
of 1997. Table 1 shows that up until 1996, approximately 20 percent of syndicated loans to
emerging markets were secured by collateral. At the time of the ﬁnancial crises of 1997, this
fraction doubled to over 40 percent. Also, Edison, Luangaram and Miller (2000) show that
in Thailand, banks loaned up to 70 to 80 percent of collateral before the Asian crisis, and
only 50 to 60 percent after the crisis. According to Gelos and Werner (1999), survey evidence
from the Bank of Thailand indicates that more than 80 percent of loans are collateralized in
Thailand. Gelos and Werner (1999) also report that around 60 percent of loans are collateralized
in Mexico. Finally, a review of ﬁnancial conditions of the Asian crises countries (IMF 1999) notes
that lending against collateral was a widespread practice also in these countries.
There is some indirect evidence which provides support for the notion that collateral consid-
5erations matter. Baek, Kang and Park (2004) ﬁnd that the stock prices of Korean ﬁrms with
higher foreign ownership suﬀered less during the crisis. This is consistent with our model if the
foreign ownership in eﬀect provided ﬁrms with more access to collateral for borrowing purposes.
Baek, Kang and Park (2004) also report evidence that ﬁrms with better disclosure rules expe-
rienced a smaller drop in asset prices. This is consistent with our model, if we suppose that
greater transparency reduces the need for collateral. If collateral constraints are not binding
on ﬁrms with better disclosure rules, then the logic in our model implies that they would have
suﬀered less with the onset of the crisis.
In our model analysis, we assume that collateral in the non-traded good sector is available for
borrowing by ﬁrms in the traded sector. Although our assumption is admittedly extreme, the
evidence suggests that some sharing of collateral across sectors does occur. In several emerging
markets a large share of the economy is dominated by groups of ﬁrms (‘chaebols’ in Korea) that
can use internal capital markets to allocate credit among ﬁrms in the group. For example, Shin
and Park (1999) report that ﬁrms in Korean chaebols guarantee bank loans taken by other ﬁrms
in the same chaebol.7 Groups typically encompass both traded and nontraded good sectors. For
example, the Samsung group (one of the largest chaebols in Korea), which has member ﬁrms in
the electricity, heavy machinery, chemical and ﬁnancial sectors (see Shin and Park, 1999). Shin
and Park (1999) also show that the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow of a chaebol ﬁrm (a
common measure of liquidity constraints) is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the cash ﬂow of other ﬁrms
within the same chaebol. This is consistent with the notion that internal credit markets allow
ﬁrms in chaebols to share collateral. Signiﬁcantly, chaebol ﬁrms make up a large fraction of
the Korean economy. For example, at the end of 1998, the top 30 chaebols in Korea accounted
for 12 percent of total GNP, 48 percent of total corporate assets and 47 percent of corporate
revenues (see Baek, Kang and Park, 2004). According to Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang
(1999), the average number of ﬁr m st h a tb e l o n gt oag r o u po fﬁr m si nS o u t h e a s tA s i aw a s7 5
percent in 1991-1996.89
In our analysis, imports are composed of intermediate goods. Because these require ﬁnance,
7In Korea a large business group is often referred as a chaebol. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC)
deﬁnes a business group as a “group of companies of which more than 30% of shares are owned by group’s
controlling shareholder and its aﬃliated companies”. Chaebol ﬁrms operate in many diﬀerent industries, are
bound together by a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, and maintain substantial business ties with other
ﬁrms in their group. They are also characterized by an extensive arrangement of pyramidal or multi-layered
share-holding arrangements and the existence of cross-debt guarantees among member ﬁrms Baek, Kang and
Park (1999).
8According to Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999, page 2), ‘A group can be described as a corporate
organization where a number of ﬁrms are linked through cross-ownership or where a single individual, family or
coalition of families owns a number of diﬀerent ﬁrms.’
9The percentages for each country break down as follows: Hong Kong, 60; Indonesia, 69; Japan, 83; South
Korea, 57; Malaysia, 57; Philippines, 74; Singapore, 67; Taiwan, 53; Thailand, 42. The average over all countries
is 75.
6the ‘credit crunch’ associated with a tightening of collateral constraints inhibits the ability of
ﬁrms to import intermediate goods. Because intermediate goods are assumed to be important
in production, this results in a fall in production and in exports. To see that intermediate goods
a r ea ni m p o r t a n tc o m p o n e n to fi m p o r t s ,s e eT a b l e2 .A c c o r d i n gt oT a b l e2 ,i n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d
imports are 50 percent of total imports for Korea and 70 percent of total imports for Indonesia
and Malaysia. Figure 2 shows real GDP and intermediate good imports and shows the close
correlation between the two. To see how imports fall during a sudden stop, consider Figure 3,
which displays exports and imports, measured in dollars, for four Asian countries.10 Note how
imports fall more than exports (of course, this is what produces the positive swing in the current
account). The fact that exports fall, despite the tremendous depreciation of the currency that
occurs in a sudden stop, is consistent with the notion in our model that the fall in imports
creates problems for domestic production.
In eﬀect, the credit crunch brings on a shortage of tradeable goods according to our model.
The shortage is acute, because lack of substitution in production between traded and non-traded
goods causes output to slow. One expects such a shortage to manifest itself in the form of a
price rise. For evidence on this, consider the data on exchange rates in Figure 4. Note that in
each of the Asian crisis countries considered there is a dramatic depreciation in the aftermath of
the crisis. The smallest depreciation is 143 percent (Philippines) and the largest is 169 percent
(Korea). Given the relatively small movements in inﬂation in these countries, these movements
in the nominal exchange rate correspond to movement in the real exchange rate. Assuming
rough purchasing power parity in traded goods, this corresponds to a very dramatic jump in the
price of traded relative to nontraded goods.
We now turn to a key assumption that causes a rise in the interest rate to be optimal in
the immediate aftermath of a sudden stop. This is the assumption that labor in the tradable
sector is diﬃcult to adjust quickly. We have not found evidence that bears directly on this
assumption. However, there is some indirect evidence. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2003) report that there is a signiﬁcant amount of labor market regulation
in emerging market countries. Also, Caballero, Cowan, Engel and Miccod (2004) report that
with more labor market regulation in emerging markets, employment ﬂexibility is reduced. If
the evidence found by Melitz (2003) and others for the US applies to crisis economies, then
the traded sector has higher value-added, more capital per worker, higher wages, etc. All these
factors are likely to be associated with greater transparency for the traded sector, which may
imply that labor market regulations are applied more eﬀectively in the traded good sector than
in the non-traded good sector. If this is so, then we can suppose that labor in the traded good
10The data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s, ‘International Financial Statistics’ data
base. Imports are imports of goods, services and payments associated with domestic assets issued to foreigners.
Exports are deﬁned analogously. The data for Korean, Malaysia, Phillipines ad Thailand. For all countries
except the Phillipines, we used annual data.
7sector reacts less ﬂexibly to shocks than does labor in the nontraded good sector.
3. Example
A basic result in the dynamic simulations reported in later sections is that a rise in the domestic
interest rate in the period of a collateral shock places upward pressure on employment and
welfare. At ﬁrst glance, this result will seem puzzling since the rise in the interest rate eﬀectively
operates like a rise in the tax rate on labor. Partial equilibrium reasoning suggests such a
distortion should lead to a decrease in employment and welfare, not an increase. In our model,
these partial equilibrium eﬀects are overwhelmed by a general equilibrium eﬀect that relaxes the
collateral constraint. In this section we present a drastically simpliﬁed version of our dynamic
model, which allows us to show how these eﬀects work. In the simpliﬁed example, there is no
money and there is only one period.
The ﬁrst subsection below displays the model. The second subsection derives the model’s
qualitative properties. Here, we state our proposition and provide a heuristic proof (details are
provided in Appendix A). The third subsection provides a numerical example.
3.1. Model
A ﬁnal good sector produces a non-traded consumption good, c, for domestic households, whose









Here, LN and LT denote labor in the nontraded and traded good sectors, respectively. The






+ π + T, (3.2)
where p is the price of consumption, w i st h ew a g er a t e ,π denotes lump-sum proﬁts and T
denotes a lump-sum transfer payment from the government. Here, we have imposed a property
o ft h ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h em o d e l ,n a m e l yt h a tt h ew a g er a t ei nt h en o n - t r a d e da n dt r a d e dg o o d
sectors must be the same. All the quantities in (3.2) are measured in units of the traded good.
The consumption good is produced using intermediate goods, of which there are two types.
O n ei sat r a d e a b l eg o o da n dt h eo t h e ri sn o n - t r a d e d . E a c ho ft h e s ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d si s
essential in the production of the ﬁnal good. The ﬁnal good production function is Leontieﬀ in
terms of traded and nontraded intermediate goods:






The one period in our example model is the analog of period 0 in our dynamic model. In
that model, the economy is in a steady state before period 0, and then in period 0 a collateral
8constraint suddenly and unexpectedly becomes binding. Since employment in the traded good
sector is chosen by intermediate good ﬁrms at the very beginning of the period, in period 0
employment is predetermined at the time of the collateral shock. Thus, for purposes of the
analysis in this section, we treat intermediate good ﬁrms’ choice of LT as a ﬁxed constant,
not subject to their choice. As a result, the only variable input in traded good production,
from the point of view of intermediate good ﬁrms, is the imported intermediate good, z. This
good must be ﬁnanced at the beginning of the period by foreign borrowing, and is subject to a
collateral constraint. The imported intermediate good, z, is essential to overall economic activity
by the Leontieﬀ assumption, (3.3). We suppose that non-traded goods are produced using a
Cobb-Douglas function of labor, LN, and capital, KN. The production functions for traded and














0 <θ , α < 1,
respectively, where yT and yN denote gross output of traded and non-traded goods, respectively.









Production of traded and non-traded intermediate goods is carried out by a single, represen-
tative, competitive ﬁrm. This assumption allows us to sidestep potential technical complications
arising from the fact that some of the economy’s collateral, the capital stock in the non-traded
good sector, exists in a sector diﬀerent from the sector that requires collateral for borrowing. By
locating all production in a single ﬁrm, we ensure that all the economy’s collateral is available to
t h ea g e n t sw h on e e di tf o rb o r r o w i n g . 11 To some extent our assumption about ﬁrms resembles
the situation of actual ﬁrms in some emerging economies. See, for example, our discussion of
chaebols in section 2. An alternative interpretation of our assumption about ﬁr m si st h a ti ti sa
stand-in for the existence of ﬁnancial institutions and markets that distribute collateral among
domestic agents.
As indicated in the previous paragraph, the representative intermediate good ﬁrm operates
















Here, pN denotes the price of non-traded goods, qi denotes the price of physical capital in sector
i, and τ denotes the labor tax rate. This tax is rebated in lump sum form to households via
11For an analysis of situations in which collateral is not equally distributed in the economy, see Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001).
9T in their budget constraint. In addition, Ki
0 is the representative ﬁrm’s initial endowment of




























Foreign borrowing is subject to the constraint that a fraction of the value of the ﬁrm’s assets










N ≤ 1, 0 ≤ τ
T ≤ 1,
where τN and τT are the fractions of capital in the indicated sectors that can be used for
collateral.
The timing of the intermediate good ﬁrm’s decisions is as follows. First, the labor tax rate,
τ,becomes known. Then, a market opens in which intermediate good ﬁrms trade capital among
themselves at prices, qN and qT.T h e n z, LN,c ,y N and yT are determined and production
occurs. Immediately after paying its wage bill, the intermediate good ﬁrm decides whether
to default on its international loans. If it does, then the creditors can seize from the ﬁrm an
amount of output equal to the ﬁrm’s obligations. It is easy to verify that the ﬁrm’s revenues,
after paying the wage bill, are suﬃcient for this.12







The ﬁrst of these expressions states that all the output of the non-traded good sector, yN, is
used as inputs in the production of non-traded goods. The second says that the gross output
of the traded good sector is divided between inputs into the production of ﬁnal goods, cT, and
gross interest payments abroad for borrowing to ﬁnance the imported intermediate good, z.
3.2. Qualitative Analysis
We list 8 equations that characterize 8 equilibrium variables - w, p, pN,q N,q T,L N,zand
the Lagrange multiplier on (3.6) - for our example. Consider the representative ﬁnal good
producer. As long as input prices are strictly positive, the ﬁnal good producer always sets
cT =[ γ/(1 − γ)]yN. Combining (3.3), (3.4) and the resource constraint, this implies:
y










12Implicitly, we suppose that z has no value to the intermediate good producer other than as an input to
production. For example, the producer has no incentive to abscond with z without producing anything.
10If the price of, say, cT, were zero, then the ﬁnal good producer would be indiﬀerent between
purchasing an amount of cT consistent with (3.7), or purchasing more. In such a case, we suppose
that the producer resolves the indiﬀerence by imposing (3.7). Competition in ﬁnal goods implies









The representative intermediate good ﬁrm’s optimal choice of KN and KT leads to the


















1 − λτT (3.10)
These are the ﬁrst order necessary conditions for optimization in the Lagrangian representation
of the representative intermediate good ﬁrm’s problem. In (3.9) and (3.10), λ ≥ 0 is the
multiplier on the collateral constraint, (3.6). Note that when the collateral constraint is binding,
the price of capital exceeds its marginal value product. This reﬂects the services the capital
provides in relaxing the collateral constraint.
The labor demand choice by the intermediate good ﬁrm leads it to equate the marginal cost,
(1 + τ)w, and value marginal product of labor in the production of non-traded goods to obtain





























Evidently, for pN < ∞, (3.12) corresponds to setting the expression in square brackets to zero.
However, we will also consider the possibility pN = ∞ (this corresponds to a zero price on cT),
in which case (3.12) does not require the expression in square brackets to be zero. Finally, the



















∗z ≥ 0. (3.13)




N > 0. (3.14)
11The latter, in combination with (3.9), impose an upper bound on λ, λ ≤ ¯ λ, where















T h e8e q u a t i o n st h a tc h a r a c t e r i z ee quilibrium are (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13),
(3.15), together with the non-negativity constraints, (3.14), and 0 ≤ λ ≤ ¯ λ.
In Appendix A, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Consider a parameterization of the model in which the equilibrium is unique
and the collateral constraint is binding (λ>0). Generically, a small increase in τ leads to an
increase in pN,z ,L N, the value of total assets and welfare.
This proposition establishes that an increase in the tax on labor raises the real exchange rate
(pN), asset values (τNqNKN +τTqTKT),i n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di m p o r t s( z), employment (LN) and
welfare in the static version of our model. This is so, if the initial equilibrium is unique and the
collateral constraint binds.
We provide a sketch of the proof to this proposition here. If we drop the complementary
slackness condition, (3.13), and ﬁx the value of the multiplier, λ, we are able to compute the
remaining 7 equilibrium variables in the model uniquely. We denote the asset values and level
of intermediate good imports computed in this way by qN (λ;τ),q T (λ), and z (λ), respectively.
The variable, τ, is not included in the argument of z (·) and qT (·) because, conditional on a
ﬁxed value of λ, t h ee q u i l i b r i u mv a l u eo ft h e s evariables are not a function of τ. I nt h ec a s eo f
z, this is obvious, since z (λ) is deﬁned by the requirement that the object in square brackets in










∗ and τ∗ denote the multiplier and labor tax rate in the type of equilibrium considered in
the proposition. In addition to uniqueness, that proposition supposes λ
∗ > 0, so that by (3.13),
C (λ
∗,τ∗)=0 . The proof requires establishing that a small increase in τ above τ∗ results in a
fall in the equilibrium value of the multiplier. That employment, asset values and utility are all
higher in the new equilibrium then follows trivially.
We establish that the equilibrium value of λ is decreasing in τ for τ ≥ τ∗ in two steps. First,
we show that C(λ,τ) is increasing in λ in a neighborhood of λ
∗ for given τ. Second, we show
that qN (λ,τ) (and, hence, C (λ,τ)) is increasing in τ for ﬁxed λ.
12To establish that C is increasing in λ, the Appendix shows that for λ approaching its upper
bound, at least one of qN or qT diverges to +∞. To see the economic motivation for this result,
suppose τT <τ N. The beneﬁt of a marginal unit of KN is its collateral value, λqNτN, plus its
marginal value product. When λ → 1/τN, then λqNτN = qN, and the collateral value of capital
equals its purchase price. In this case, KN i sa‘ m o n e y - p u m p ’ :a$ 1p u r c h a s eo fKN generates
$1 in value as collateral plus the value marginal product of capital in production. Consequently,
as λ → 1/τN the demand for KN approaches inﬁnity, as does its market clearing price, qN.I f
τT >τ N, then ¯ λ =1 /τT. In this case, if λ → 1/τT, then qT →∞ . Because z (λ) is bounded
above, it follows that C>0 for λ suﬃciently large. This implies that, generically, C must be
increasing in λ at λ = λ
∗. It may be possible to construct an example where the slope of C at
λ = λ
∗ is zero, but to avoid contradicting our assumption of a unique equilibrium, that slope
would have to be zero at only the point, λ = λ
∗. S u c ha ne x a m p l ei sn o n - g e n e r i c .T h es l o p eo ff
cannot be negative at λ = λ
∗ because in this case, C>0 for suﬃciently high values of λ would
r e q u i r et h a tt h e r eb eas e c o n dλ with f =0 , and such a scenario contradicts the hypothesis of
equilibrium uniqueness. Thus, we conclude that, generically, C is strictly increasing in λ for λ
near λ
∗.
That qN is increasing in τ for ﬁxed λ is also intuitive. The requirement that the expression
in square brackets in (3.12) be zero has the eﬀect of associating a unique z with each λ>0,
independent of the value of τ. By (3.7) the given value of λ>0 also implies a unique LN,
independent of τ.Under perfect competition, pN must be equal to the marginal cost of producing
the nontraded good. For a given value of LN, a higher value of τ raises that marginal cost, and
so pN is increasing in τ for given λ. In view of (3.9), we conclude that qN increases in τ for given
λ.
Since C has a positive slope at λ = λ
∗ a n ds h i f t su pw i t har i s ei nτ, it follows immediately
that equilibrium λ is falling in τ (see Figure 5). From this discussion, it is clear that what is
crucial in the result is that τN > 0. If τN =0 , so that capital in the non-traded good sector is
useless in the collateral constraint, then an increase in τ has no impact on the equilibrium. So,
although our result requires that some physical capital in the nontraded sector be available as
collateral for borrowing by the traded sector, it does not require that this be the only or even
the largest component of that collateral.
3.3. Quantitative Analysis
We illustrate the proposition in the previous subsection with a numerical example. We report
equilibrium outcomes for a range of values of the labor tax rate. We adopt the following
13parameter values:
A =2 ,R
∗ =1 .06,θ=0 .8,γ=0 .43,α =0 .25,τ
N = τ
T =0 .1,
ψ0 =0 .06,ψ=1 ,K
N = K
T =1 ,ν=0 .3
We computed equilibrium allocations corresponding to τ in the range, 0.00 to 0.85. The upper
bound on this range is just below the tax rate that would drive the price of cT to zero (see





. By considering a ﬁne grid of λ ∈ J, we found that, for each value of τ considered, the
equilibrium is unique. The values of utility, 1/pN,τ NqNKN +τTqTKT,λ ,z ,L N corresponding
to each τ are displayed in Figure 6. Note that for τ in the range of 0 to 0.7, λ>0. Consistent
with the proposition, utility is strictly increasing in this range. The increase in τ also raises pN,
LN,zand τNqNKN + τTqTKT. The latter has the eﬀect of relaxing the collateral constraint,
which is reﬂected in the fall in λ. Note that the initial value of λ is extremely high. According to
(3.12), λ is equivalent to a tax on the purchase of the foreign intermediate input. When τ =0
this tax wedge is about 250%. By increasing the labor tax rate, the shadow tax rate on foreign
borrowing is completely eliminated.
For τ beyond 0.7, utility and employment are invariant to additional increases in τ. This
i sb e c a u s ei nt h i sr a n g e ,z is in a sense the binding constraint on domestic production. The
amount of z, w h i c hi sn o wp i n n e dd o w nb yV and R∗ in (3.12), determines LN through (3.7).
4. The Dynamic, Monetary Model
Our model builds on the structure analyzed in the previous section, and so we limit explanations
and motivations to what is new here.
4.1. Households
Household preferences over consumption and leisure are the dynamic version of the preferences














13As a result, the scarcity assumption on z discussed in Appendix A is satisﬁed for each τ considered in the
example.
14The household begins the period with a stock of liquid assets, ˜ Mt. Of this, it allocates
deposits, Dt, with the ﬁnancial intermediary, and the rest, ˜ Mt−Dt, to consumption expenditures.
The household faces the following cash constraint on consumption expenditures:
P
T
t ptct ≤ P
T
t wtLt + ˜ Mt − Dt, (4.2)
where wt denotes the wage rate and pt denotes the price of ﬁnal goods, both denominated in
units of the tradable good. In addition, PT
t denotes the domestic currency prices of traded
goods.
The law of motion of the household’s assets is:











Here, Rt denotes the gross domestic nominal rate of interest, πt denotes ﬁrm proﬁts and Xt is
a liquidity injection from the monetary authority. Proﬁts, πt, are measured in units of traded
goods. According to (4.3), the household’s liquid assets at the beginning of period t+1include
interest earnings and principal on Dt + Xt,p r o ﬁts, and any cash that may be left unspent in
the period t goods market.
The household maximizes (4.1) subject to (4.2)-(4.3), and a particular timing constraint. The
household’s deposit decision is made before the realization of the collateral shock and before the
realization of the current period monetary action.
4.2. Firms
The structure of production is the same as in the static example. One representative, com-
petitive ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal good, ct, and another representative, competitive ﬁrm produces
intermediate goods.
4.2.1. Final Good Firms
Final goods are produced from intermediate goods using the following constant elasticity of












,η≥ 0, 0 <γ<1. (4.4)
Here, η ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between tradeable, cT, and nontradable inter-
mediate goods, cN, respectively. Equation (4.4) reduces to (3.3) in the previous section in the












t denotes the domestic currency price of non-traded goods. The
ﬁnal good ﬁr mt a k e sp r i c e sa sg i v e n .
154.2.2. Intermediate Inputs
The representative ﬁrm that produces the traded and non-traded intermediate inputs manages
three types of debt, two of which are short-term. The ﬁrm borrows at the beginning of the
period to ﬁnance its wage bill and to purchase a foreign input, and repays these loans at the end
of the period. In addition, the ﬁrm holds the outstanding stock of external (net) indebtedness,
Bt.14



















∗Bt +( Bt+1 − Bt). (4.6)
Here, πt denotes dividends, denominated in units of the traded good. Also, Bt denotes the stock
of external debt at the beginning of period t, denominated in units of the traded good; R∗ is the
gross rate of interest (ﬁxed in units of the traded good) on loans for the purpose of purchasing
zt;a n dr∗ is the net rate of interest (again, ﬁx e di nt e r m so ft h et r a d e dg o o d )o nt h eo u t s t a n d i n g
stock of external debt. The price, Λt+1, is taken parametrically by ﬁrms. In equilibrium, this
price is the multiplier on πt in the (Lagrangian representation of the) household problem.


































where ξ is the elasticity of substitution between value-added, Vt, in the traded good sector and
the imported intermediate good, zt. In the production functions, KT and KN denote capital
in the traded and non-traded good sectors, respectively. They are owned by the representative
intermediate input ﬁrm. The stock of capital is assumed to be ﬁxed throughout the analysis.






In equilibrium, borrowing must satisfy the following restriction:
Bt+1
(1 + r∗)
t → 0, as t →∞ . (4.8)
14One implication of our assumptions is that all ﬁnancial assets and liabilities in the economy are concentrated
in the hands of a single (representative) ﬁrm. For a discussion of this property of our model, recall section 3.
16We suppose that international ﬁnancial markets impose that this limit cannot be positive. That
it cannot be negative is an implication of ﬁrm optimality.






t+j,j=0 ,1,2,... and the indicated technology. In addition, the
ﬁrm takes all prices and rates of return as given and beyond its control. The ﬁrm also takes
the initial stock of debt, Bt, as given. This completes the description of the ﬁrm problem in the
pre-crisis version of the model, when collateral constraints are ignored.












Here, qi,i= N,T denote the value (in units of the traded good) of a unit of capital in the
nontraded and traded good sectors, respectively. Also, τi denotes the fraction of these stocks
accepted as collateral by international creditors. The left side of (4.9) is the total value of
collateral, and the right side is the payout value of the ﬁrm’s external debt. Before the crisis,
ﬁrms ignore (4.9), and assign a zero probability that it will be implemented. With the onset of
the crisis, ﬁrms believe (correctly) that (4.9) must be satisﬁed in every period henceforth, and
do not entertain the possibility that it will be removed.
Note that we do not include the ﬁrm’s working capital loans in (4.9). One interpretation is
that there are no collateral requirements on domestic loans. An alternative interpretation of the
absence of working capital loans in (4.9) is that (i) domestic lenders accept a broader range of
assets as collateral than do foreign lenders and (ii) this broader range of assets exists in such a
large quantity that the collateral constraint on domestic loans is never binding.15
We obtain qN
t and qT
t by diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian representation of the ﬁrm optimization
problem with respect to KN and KT, respectively. The equilibrium value of the asset prices, qi
t,
i = N,T, is the amount that a potential ﬁrm would be willing to pay in period t, in units of the
traded good, to acquire a unit of capital and start production in period t.W el e tλt ≥ 0 denote











1 − λtτi ,i = N,T. (4.10)
Here, VMPi
k,t denotes the period t value (in terms of traded goods) marginal product of capital
in sector i. When λt ≡ 0, so that the collateral constraint is not binding, then qi
t is the present
discounted value of the marginal physical product of capital. Asset prices are higher when λt > 0
reﬂecting that in this case capital is also valuable for alleviating the collateral constraint.
15The assumption that more assets can be used as collateral against domestic borrowing than foreign borrowing
in emerging markets is a basic assumption of Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2007).
17In our model capital is never actually traded since all ﬁrms are identical in equilibrium. Out
of equilibrium, the ﬁrm might default on its external debt, and foreign creditors would then force
t h es a l eo f( af r a c t i o no f )t h eﬁrm’s physical assets. The price, qi
t, is how many traded goods
a domestic resident would be willing to pay in exchange for a unit of the ith type of capital.
Foreign creditors would receive those traded goods in the event of a default. We assume that
with these consequences for default, default never occurs in equilibrium.
To understand the impact of a binding collateral constraint on ﬁrm decisions, it is useful to
consider the Euler equations of the ﬁrm. Diﬀerentiating Lagrangian representation of the ﬁrm





∗)(1 + λt+1),t =0 ,1,2,... . (4.11)
Following standard practice in the small open economy literature, we assume β(1 + r∗)=1 . A
high value for λt+1, which occurs when the collateral constraint is binding, raises the eﬀective
rate of interest on external debt. As a result, the price of πt relative to πt+s is increased, and we
can expect πt to be reduced. The ﬁrm can accomplish this by paying oﬀ the external debt, i.e.,
running a positive current account. The other eﬀect of λt > 0 is to raise the eﬀective interest
rate cost of zt, and so we can expect imports to drop with λt > 0. As emphasized in section 2, a
drop in imports and a rise in the current account are two important features of a sudden stop.
4.3. Monetary Authority and Equilibrium
The ﬁnancial intermediary takes domestic currency deposits, Dt, from the household at the
beginning of period t. In addition, it receives the liquidity transfer, Xt = xtMt, from the
monetary authority.16 The ﬁnancial intermediary then lends all its domestic funds to ﬁrms
which use them to ﬁnance their employment working capital requirements, PTwL. Clearing in
the money market requires Dt + Xt = PT
t wtLt, or, after scaling by the beginning-of-period t
aggregate money stock,











where dt = Dt/Mt.
Equilibrium is a sequence of prices and quantities having the properties: (i) for each date,
the quantities solve the household and ﬁrm problems, given the prices, and (ii) the labor, goods
and domestic money markets clear.
Clearing in the money market requires that (4.12) hold and that actual money balances, Mt,
equal desired money balances, ˜ Mt. Combining this with the household’s cash constraint, (4.2),
16In practice, injections of liquidity do not occur in the form of lump sum transfers, as they do here. It is easy
to show that our formulation is equivalent to an alternative, in which the injection occurs as a result of an open
market purchase of government bonds which are owned by the household, but held by the ﬁnancial intermediary.
To conserve on notation, we do not adopt this interpretation in our formal model.
18we obtain the equilibrium cash constraint:
p
T
t ptct =1+xt. (4.13)
According to this the total end of period stock of money must equal the value of ﬁnal output,







t = −(Bt+1 − Bt). (4.14)
The left side of this expression is the current account of the balance of payments, i.e., total
production of traded goods, net of foreign interest payments, net of domestic consumption. The
right side of (4.14) is the change in net foreign assets. Equation (4.14) reﬂects our assumption
that external borrowing to ﬁnance the intermediate good, zt, is fully paid back at the end of
the period. That is, this borrowing resembles short-term trade credit. Note, however, that
this is not a binding constraint on the ﬁrm, since our setup permits the ﬁrm to ﬁnance these






Our procedure for computing the equilibrium of the model is described in details in Appendix
B and corresponds to a variation on the procedure applied in Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2004)
5. Quantitative Analysis
In this section we begin with a discussion of the parameterization of the model. We then report
the model’s implications for optimal monetary policy.
5.1. Parameter Values and Steady State
The time period of the model is one-half year and the values of the model parameters are
displayed in Table 3. These values were selected so that the model’s steady state in the absence
of collateral constraints (i.e., the ‘pre-crisis steady state’ in Table 4) roughly matches features
of Korean data (and, to a lesser extent, Argentina) during the ﬁrst semester of 1997. Tradables
were about one-third of total production for Korea before the crisis, assuming that tradables
correspond to the non-service sectors. Combining this share estimate with estimates of labor’s
share from Young (1995), we estimate capital income shares for the tradable and nontradable
sector in Korea to be 0.48 and 0.21, respectively. These shares are similar to what Uribe (1997)
and Rebelo and Vegh (1995) report for Argentina. They estimate that capital’s share is 0.52 and
0.37 in the tradable and nontradable sectors of Argentina, respectively. We take an intermediate
point between all these estimates by specifying ν =0 .50 and α =0 .36. Reinhart and Vegh (1995)
19estimate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption for Argentina to be equal
to 0.2. We adopt the somewhat higher elasticity of 0.25 by setting σ =4 . We take the foreign
interest rate to be equal to 6 percent and we assume a rate of money growth that implies an
annual nominal domestic interest rate of 12 percent, roughly in line with the experience of Korea
in the years before the crises. We set ψ =1 , implying a labor supply elasticity of 1.
To determine a value for μ we considered the 1995 Korean input-output tables. According
to those tables, the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to value added in manufacturing,
construction, services and agriculture were 0.40, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01, respectively. Assuming that
most tradables are in manufacturing, these ﬁndings are roughly consistent with our model
speciﬁcation that all imported intermediate goods are used in the tradable sector. We selected
a value of μ that implies z/V =0 .3, a number that corresponds closely with the manufacturing
number in Korea (see Table 4 for the properties of the pre-crisis steady state of our model).
A sn o t e da b o v e ,w ee s t i m a t et h a tt h es h a r eo ft r a d a b l eg o o d si nK o r e a np r o d u c t i o ni sr o u g h l y
one third. This is reasonably close to our model, where the analogous ﬁgure is 0.275. Finally,
our initial stock of debt is 13.6, or 32 percent of annual GDP. This percent lies very close to
Korea’s stock of external debt on the eve of the crisis, which was 33 percent of annual GDP.
The Korean debt to annual GDP ratio was around 26.8 percent of annual GDP at the end of
the year 2000. This corresponds closely to the model, which implies a debt to annual GDP
ratio of 27 percent in the post crisis steady state, the steady state associated with the collateral
constraint (see Table 5).
5.2. Optimal Monetary Policy
We now consider the optimal monetary policy response to the unexpected imposition of the
collateral constraint in period 0.I n t h e p e r i o d s b e f o r e t =0the economy is in the pre-crisis
steady state in which there is no collateral constraint. At the start of period 0, the household
makes its deposit decision and the intermediate good ﬁrm makes its employment decision in the
traded good sector. Agents make these decisions in the belief that the economy will remain in the
pre-crisis steady state. Immediately afterward, the collateral constraint on borrowing is imposed
and agents correctly expect the constraint to remain in place forever. The monetary authority
announces a sequence of (optimal) monetary actions from period 0 and on. The deterministic
equilibrium is characterized by convergence to a new steady state.
The quantitative properties of the equilibrium are displayed in Figure 7. The thick line
indicates the optimal equilibrium, while the thin line indicates a feasible equilibrium in which
the interest rate increases by a smaller amount. The feasible equilibrium will be discussed later.
Note ﬁrst how the nominal rate of interest rises sharply in the period of the shock, jumping
f r o ma1 2p e r c e n ta n n u a lr a t ei nt h ei n i t i a ls t e a d ys t a t e ,t o7 8p e r c e n ti np e r i o d0 .W ed e n o t e




















where the last equality makes use of zero proﬁts and productive eﬃciency in the ﬁnal goods
sector.17 In (5.1) we have the familiar result that the real exchange rate is a monotone decreasing
function of the relative price of nontraded versus traded goods, pN. According to Figure 7, there
is a substantial, 34 percent, real exchange rate depreciation in the period of the crisis, so that we
can infer that pN f a l l s .T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei sv i r t u a l l yb a c ka ti t sp r e - c r i s i sl e v e li np e r i o d1 ,
the period after the collateral shock. The nominal exchange rate depreciates roughly as much
(30 percent) as the real exchange rate in the period of the shock, though the impact on the
nominal exchange rate is much more persistent.
Turning to asset prices, we consider the value of assets in the nontraded sector, qN, and an
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Here, the subscript, s, denotes base year which we take to correspond to the initial steady state.
Both the stock market index as well as assets in the non-traded sector increase in value by nearly
3 percent in the period of the shock and then settle at a 2 percent increase in value thereafter.
Note how the current account rises sharply in the optimal equilibrium, to over 5 percent of
the initial steady state level of output. This reﬂects in part the 36 percent decline in imports
of intermediate goods, z. Gross output drops by a very large 15 percent relative to its initial
steady state level. Consumption and employment fall even more than output. The greater fall
in employment reﬂects diminishing returns in production. In the new steady state, imports,
employment, output and consumption are higher than they are in the initial steady state. This
reﬂects that optimal policy drives the interest rate lower in the new steady state, and this
reduces the ineﬃciency of the labor market. In addition, the lower external debt produced by
the positive current account has a positive wealth eﬀect on consumption. Inﬂation jumps from
a 3 percent annual rate in the initial steady state to about 30 percent in the period after the
shock, before stabilizing at -2.5 percent. The 4 percent higher level of employment in the new
17We assume purchasing power parity in traded goods, so that PT = SP∗, where S denotes the nominal
exchange rate and P∗ i st h ef o r e i g np r i c ei n d e x .W ea s s u m et h a tP∗ is exogenous with respect to the events in










21steady state raises the marginal productivity of capital and helps account for the permanently
higher level of asset prices.
To understand the role of monetary policy, as opposed to the collateral shock itself, in these
results we compare the optimal and benchmark equilibria. The results indicate that the sharp
rise in the interest rate in the optimal policy has eﬀects much like those in the simple static
example in the previous section. The rise in the interest rate drives up pN (note how the real
exchange rate appreciates going from the benchmark to the optimal policy). The rise in pN
produces a rise in qN,the value of assets in the nontraded sector. In the benchmark equilibrium,
qN falls 1.7 percent in the period of the shock, while - as noted above - it rises by 2 percent
in the optimal equilibrium. The sharp rise in the interest rate has a similar positive impact on
the overall value of assets. The rise in asset values alleviate the collateral constraint, so that
the multiplier in the optimal equilibrium is substantially smaller than it is in the benchmark
equilibrium. The improvement in the collateral constraint permits an expansion in imports and
this in turn produces an expansion in employment, output and consumption. In the process,
the exchange rate depreciation - both real and nominal - are less severe. In eﬀect, the sharp rise
in the interest rate slows - but does not reverse - the exchange rate depreciation.
Our model is too simple to justify formal econometric testing against the data. It is never-
theless important to see whether the model conforms qualitatively with actual currency crisis
data. Credibility of the analysis also requires that the quantitative magnitude of the mecha-
nisms analyzed here lie at least within an order of magnitude of the actual data. To investigate
these issues, we compare the model’s implications with the Korean data. Figure 8 shows the
dynamic simulation of the model when policy in the model roughly replicates the interest rate
in Korea. We see that, with one exception, the model’s qualitative predictions correspond well
with the actual data. The model captures the ba s i cd i r e c t i o no fm o v e m e n to fe a c ho fo u r1 0
variables in the Korean currency crisis. The exception is that labor productivity fell during the
Korean crisis whereas labor productivity rises in the wake the crisis in our model. Reductions
in labor productivity and total factor productivity are often associated with severe economic
recessions, and exploring the reasons for this is an important topic for research. Aoki, Benigno
and Kiyotaki (2007)’s theoretical analysis explores the possibility that the international credit
disruptions that are the focus of our analysis may be accompanied by domestic credit disrup-
tions. Aoki, et al show how in principle the misallocation of resources induced by disruptions in
domestic credit can produce a decline in labor productivity. We do not know whether integrating
these considerations would substantially alter the conclusions of this paper.
Consider now the quantitative implications of the model. Figure 8 indicates that the quanti-
tative eﬀects of the mechanisms we explore are large. For example, consumption, employment,
output and inﬂation substantially overshoot their empirical counterparts. At the same time,
our model understates the movements in the current account, real and nominal exchange rate,
22and asset prices. Still, in view of our model’s simplicity, we interpret the evidence in Figure 8
as broadly favorable to the notion that the model captures key aspects of the Korean currency
crisis episode. This is a necessary condition for taking its policy implications seriously.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the optimal monetary policy response to a ﬁnancial crisis of the kind
experienced by the Asian economies in 1997-98. These crises, as many other emerging market
crises, were characterized by a sudden reversal in capital inﬂows. Using a particular open
economy model with collateral constraints, we found that the optimal monetary response to
such a crisis involves an initial increase in interest rates, followed by a relatively sharp and rapid
reduction in rates in the aftermath of the crisis. Interestingly, this is the policy that was actually
followed.
In our model, increasing the interest rate is very much like raising a tax. As a result,
our analysis may also yield insight into the episodes of “expansionary ﬁscal consolidations”
emphasized by a large literature initiated by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). For example, Perotti
(1999) presents some evidence that large tax increases are more likely to stimulate the economy
when levels of debt are high. Based on this, he argues that a model is required in which the
response of the economy to tax changes depends on the initial conditions, such as the level of
debt. Our model is very much in this spirit.
To keep the analysis simple, our model abstracts from investment. In principle, including
investment could improve the model’s empirical implications. However, whether it does so
remains an important, open question. Because capital appears in the collateral constraint,
investment in physical capital represents an alternative strategy - relative to that of paying
oﬀ international debt - by which agents can reduce the burden of the collateral constraint. In
eﬀect, a binding collateral constraint creates incentives to pay oﬀ the external debt, as well as
to invest in domestic capital.18 Thus, in principle one cannot rule out the possibility that in an
environment in which investment is a choice variable, a binding collateral constraint could lead to
an increase in investment, and to a fall in the current account.19 Clearly, this would deal a blow
to the hypothesis that tightening collateral constraints were the proximate cause of the Asian
ﬁnancial crises. We suspect, however, that with reasonable investment adjustment costs and
other frictions, paying oﬀ the international debt would dominate investment in physical capital
as a strategy for reducing the burden of the collateral constraint. If so, then the introduction of
variable investment would improve our model’s empirical implications, by magnifying the rise
18For a recent statement of this conjecture, see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005).
19Mendoza (2005) provides an example of a sudden stop similar to ours, except that he also includes investment.
He ﬁnds that when collateral constraints tighten, investment drops. (Mendoza does not study the implications
of sudden stop for monetary policy, which is our central focus.)
23in the current account in the wake of a ﬁnancial crisis.
At a methodological level, this paper adds to the literature that studies the impact of ﬁnancial
frictions on the monetary transmission mechanism. In traditional models, ﬁnancial frictions have
the eﬀect of magnifying - through an ‘accelerator eﬀect’ - the eﬀects of monetary actions, without
changing their sign. In this model we have shown that ﬁnancial frictions could actually have a
‘reverse accelerator eﬀect’, in that they reverse the sign of the eﬀect of a monetary action.
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27Table 1: Syndicated Loans to Emerging Markets
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
Year Total Secured Secured as % of Total
1993 47.5 7.9 16.5
1994 64.9 11.5 17.7
1995 93.0 16.1 17.3
1996 104.3 22.0 21.1
1997 143.7 61.4 42.7
1998 77.3 25.9 33.5
1999 73.1 26.3 35.9
Source: Capital Data, Loanware
Table 2: Intermediate Imports and Total Imports
Panel A: Thailand
Year Total Intermediate % of Total
1993 45,995 17,184 37%
1994 54,338 19,294 36%
1995 70,718 25,061 35%
1996 72,248 24,874 34%
1997 63,286 21,860 35%
1998 42,403 14,744 35%
1999 49,919 18,205 36%
2000 62,181 23,663 38%
2001 61,847 22,978 37%
2002 64,317 24,461 38%
Panel B: Korea












Year Total Intermediate % of Total
1993
1994
1995 77,601 50,447 65%
1996 78,426 52,201 67%
1997 79,036 51,922 66%
1998 58,293 40,901 70%
1999 65,389 48,321 74%
2000 81,963 61,233 75%
2001 73,856 53,271 72%
2002 79,881 56,939 71%
Panel D: Indonesia












Year Total Intermediate % of Total
1993 17,597 7,855 45%
1994 21,333 9,559 45%
1995 26,538 12,174 46%
1996 32,427 14,015 43%
1997 35,933 14,663 41%
1998 29,660 11,586 39%
1999 30,726 12,596 41%
2000 34,491 16,747 49%
2001 33,058 15,121 46%
2002 35,427 14,791 42%
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd
29Table 3: Parameters Values of the Model
β 0.943 γ 0.26
ψ 1.00 R 1.12
R∗ 1.06 r∗ 0.06
α 0.36 KN 10
ν 0.5 KT 5
ζ 0.0 μ 3.5
τ 0.05 θ 0.7
ψ0 0.0036 σ 4
A 1.5 ξ 0.9
η 0.015
Note : Here, β, R and R
∗ are expressed in annualized terms.
Table 4: Pre-crisis steady state
L 30 z 2.7
LT 7.3 LN 22.7
cT 6 cN 16.9
w 0.4 V 9.1
cT
pNcN+yT−R∗z 0.275 yT 9.2
pN 0.9 pT 0.05





30Table 5: Post-crisis Steady State Under Optimal Monetary Policy
L 31.2 z 2.7
LT 7.6 LN 23.6
cT 6.2 cN 17.3
w 0.43 V 9.3
cT
pNcN+yT−R∗z 0.276 yT 9.3
pN 0.9 pT 0.04





317. Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Following is a proof of the proposition in section 3.2. We begin by describing the details of the
mapping discussed in the text, taking the multiplier, λ ≥ 0, on the collateral constraint, into
candidate equilibrium prices and quantities. An equilibrium for λ is a value for this parameter
such that the complementary slackness condition on the collateral constraint is satisﬁed (see
(3.13)). We then discuss a condition on model parameters implied by the assumption in our
proposition that equilibrium is unique. The condition ensures that the traded intermediate
good, cT, is a ‘scarce’ factor in the production of ﬁnal goods. In particular, we note that, in
the absence of the collateral constraint, there is a maximum amount of cT, we call this amount
cT
0, that can be produced, after paying for ther e q u i r e di m p o r t e di n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d ,z.G i v e n
that employment, LT, in the traded good sector is ﬁxed in our static model, producing cT
0 does
not require the reallocation of domestic resources from other useful activities. Under these
circumstances, the domestic market price of cT
0 will be positive only if cT
0 is ‘scarce’. That is, cT
is scarce if with a zero price on cT and in the absence of collateral constraints, domestic demand
for cT would exceed cT
0.W h e ncT is not scarce, then there are at least two equilibria, if there are
any. Evidently, that cT is scarce is an implication of our assumption that equilibrium is unique.
We begin by deﬁning a set of candidate equilibrium functions, z (λ,τ),L N (λ,τ),p N (λ,τ)






z (z) − R

























where pN ≥ 0 and
κ =
γ (1 − α)
¡
KN¢α
ψ0 (LN + LT)
ψ (LN)
α. (7.4)
Equations (7.1) and (7.2) are (3.12) and (3.7), respectively, reproduced here for convenience.
Equation (7.3) is obtained by using (3.11) and (3.15) to substitute out for w/p.




R∗ (1 + λ)
¶1
θ
V, λ ≥ 0. (7.5)
This will be our candidate equilibrium value of z in case it turns out that 1/pN > 0. The
function, zλ, is strictly positive and strictly decreasing for each λ ≥ 0, and zλ → 0 as λ →∞ .









32It is readily veriﬁed that the function, cT
λ, is strictly decreasing and positive for each λ ≥ 0, and
that cT
λ → 0 as λ →∞ . Let LN














λ is strictly positive and strictly decreasing for each λ ≥ 0, with LN
λ → 0 as λ →∞ .
Deﬁne the function, κλ,τ :
κλ,τ =m a x
"










The ﬁrst object in square brackets is strictly positive and increasing in λ ≥ 0, converging to ∞
as λ →∞and converging to a positive constant as λ → 0. If that constant is less than 1+τ,
there is a value of λ, call it ˜ λ(τ), such that the ﬁrst and second terms are equal. That is, ˜ λ(τ)
is deﬁned by











if such a ˜ λ(τ) ≥ 0 exists. The function, κλ,τ, is strictly positive for λ ≥ 0. If ˜ λ(τ) does not
exist, then κλ,τ is strictly increasing in λ for all λ ≥ 0, and otherwise κλ,τ is strictly increasing













Note that if κλ,τ > 1+τ,then 1/pN (λ) > 0. In this case, condition (7.1) requires the expression
in square brackets to be zero, and so in this case we set z (λ,τ)=zλ and LN (λ,τ)=LN
λ .
Suppose κλ,τ =1+τ.Then condition (7.1) does not require the expression in square brackets
to be zero. Let LN (τ) be the unique solution to the following expression:



















λ ≥ L(λ,τ). (7.8)














33Condition (7.8) and the fact that zλ and LN
λ both satisfy (7.2) imply that the previous equation
generically has two solutions. The object, z (λ,τ), is taken to be the smaller of the two solutions.
It is easy to verify that
zλ ≥ z (λ,τ).
Thus, when 1/pN =0 , then the object in square brackets in (7.1) evaluated at z (λ,τ) is zero
or, possibly, positive. Either way, (7.1) is satisﬁed.
This completes our discussion of the candidate equilibrium functions, z (λ,τ),L N (λ,τ),
pN (λ,τ). Note that these functions satisfy (7.1)-(7.3), as well as the condition, pN ≥ 0. Expres-
sions (3.8) and (3.11) can then be used to compute candidate equilibrium functions for w and
p.






























An equilibrium is a value of λ ≥ 0 such that C(λ,τ) ≥ 0 and λC(λ,τ)=0 .
It is easy to see that if 1/pN =0when λ =0 , then it is possible to construct two equilibria.
In this case, ˜ λ(τ) exists and as λ → ˜ λ(τ) from above, 1/pN → 0. As a result, as λ → ˜ λ(τ) then
qN →∞ . In particular, C(λ,τ) > 0 for λ close enough to ˜ λ(τ). Since, for the reasons outlined
in the text, C(λ,τ) > 0 for λ close enough to ¯ λ, it follows that if there is an equilibrium, there
are at least two. We rule out this scenario by assuming that the traded good input, cT is scarce.











where ¯ τ i st h el a r g e s tv a l u eo ft h el a b o rt a xr a t e ,τ,that we consider. The term on the left of the
equality is the equilibrium demand for cT when the collateral constraint is absent and 1/pN =0 ,
and the term on the right is the maximal supply. With the above assumption, 1/pN > 0 for
λ ≥ 0, and the argument for multiple equilibria just described does not apply.
The proof of the proposition in the text is now easy to summarize. The function, C (λ,τ),
is continuous and bounded for each 0 ≤ λ<¯ λ. As λ approaches ¯ λ, either qN or qT diverges to
∞. Hence, there is some λ close enough to ¯ λ such that C (λ,τ) > 0. Generically, C (λ,τ) cuts
the zero line (see Figure 5) from below.
34In an equilibrium with λ>0, it must be that 1/pN > 0. Suppose otherwise, that 1/pN =0 .
In this case, qN = ∞ and C (λ,τ) > 0, contradicting C (λ,τ)=0 . >From 1/pN > 0, it follows
that LN (λ,τ) and qT (λ,τ) are not functions of τ.The only way τ enters C (λ,τ) is via pN(λ,τ)
in qN (λ,τ). It is then easy to see that since pN (λ,τ) is increasing in τ, qN (λ,τ) is increasing
in τ too. Since C(λ,τ) is increasing in τ and C (λ,τ) is increasing in λ at the equilibrium value
of λ, for given τ, it follows that equilibrium λ is decreasing in τ.
To see what happens to equilibrium pN with the increase in τ, consider (7.6). According to
that expression, the increase in τ aﬀects pN in two ways. The direct channel via the denominator
term drives pN up. A second channel operates via κλ,τ. When 1/pN > 0,κ λ,τ is not a function
of τ, a n di ti sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fλ. So, the fall in λ drives pN up. With both channels
driving pN up after a rise in τ, we conclude that equilibrium pN rises with an increase in τ.
To see what happens to z, note that when 1/pN > 0, then z is determined by (7.5). The fall
in λ induced by the rise in τ makes z increase. Because the collateral constraint is satisﬁed as a
strict equality, we conclude that the value of assets increases. However, it is not clear whether
this is because of a rise in qT or qN, or both.



















using (3.3) and (3.4). Diﬀerentiating this function, it is easy to verify that it is strictly increasing
in LN u pt ot h ep o i n tw h e r e,
γ (1 − α)Kα
ψ0 (LN + LT)
ψ (LN)
α =1 .
Our assumption that cT is scarce guarantees κ>1+τ in (7.4). We conclude that utility is
increasing in τ. Q.E.D.
It is straightforward to see what happens when the collateral function, C(λ,τ), crosses the
zero line twice in Figure 5, in which case there are two equilibria. When τ is increased there exists
an equilibrium in the neighborhood of the high λ equilibrium, which satisﬁes our proposition.
However, there exists an equilibrium in the neighborhood of the low λ equilibrium, in which the
results of the proposition are reversed. These observations about comparative statitics when
there are multiple equilibria but no credible equilibrium selection mechanism is available are of
little practical interest.
8. Appendix B: Algorithm for Finding the Optimal Equilibrium
Monetary policy is characterized by a sequence of money growth rates, x0,x 1,... . The optimal
policy is the sequence that has an equilibrium with the highest utility associated with it. For
35a given sequence of money growth rates, we compute an equilibrium for the model as follows.
We impose that the steady state is achieved at a particular date, T +1 , and that the collateral
constraint is non-binding thereafter. The computational strategy is a dynamic version of the
strategy used to solve the static example in section 3. In particular, we ﬁnd λ0,...,λT which
solve the T +1complementary slackness conditions for t =0 ,...,T associated with the collateral
constraint in the Lagrangian representation of the ﬁrm problem. To evaluate these complemen-
tary slackness conditions for a given set, λ0,...,λT, we proceed as follows. First, we ﬁxav a l u eo f
the new steady state debt, which we denote by Bs. Second, conditional on this value of Bs, we
compute all the variables in the new steady state. Third, we use all the equilibrium conditions
of the model, except (4.14) and the complementary slackness conditions, to compute a set of
candidate values for variables in the dynamic equilibrium. Fourth, the current account equation,
(4.14), and the initial debt are used to recursively compute Bt,t=1 ,..... S t e p s2t o4d e ﬁne
a mapping from Bs into itself. We adjust Bs until a ﬁxed point is found. The complementary
slackness equations are evaluated using the candidate equilibrium variables in step 3 together
with the ﬁxed point value of Bs. The values of λ0,...,λT are adjusted until the complementary
slackness conditions are satisﬁed. We set T =1 9 , although Figures 7 and 8 suggested that a
smaller value of T w o u l dh a v ew o r k e dj u s ta sw e l l .
For many money growth sequences, including the optimal one, we found two equilibria. In
one, the collateral constraint is satisﬁed as a strict equality in the new steady state, and in the
other the collateral constraint is satisﬁed as a strict inequality in the new steady state. We
always select the equilibrium that produces the higher level of utility, and this is typically the
equilibrium in which the collateral constraint is satisﬁed as a strict inequality in the new steady
state.
8.1. Equilibrium Conditions
We diﬀerentiate between the variables dated t =0and t ≥ 1, because the set of equations to be
solved and the variables whose values are to be determined are diﬀerent. The 17 variables to be





















t−1,R t,z t,d t, Λt,y
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36for t =1 ,2,... . We obtain equation (8.1) by combining the following three equations. The










,t =1 ,2, ... . (8.2)
The intertemporal Euler equation of the ﬁrm is:
Λt =( 1+λt)Λt+1,t =1 ,2,... . (8.3)
Here, Λt is the multiplier on the household’s period t−1 ﬂow budget constraint in the Lagrangian













for t =1 ,2,... . Equations (8.2)-(8.4) can be combined to produce 8.1.











,t =0 ,1,.... . (8.5)













,t =0 ,1,.... (8.6)





















μ(1 − θ)=( 1+λt)R
∗,t =0 ,1,.... . (8.8)
Labor in the traded and nontraded sectors receives the same wage, and so the value marginal



















,t =1 ,.... . (8.9)
Equation (8.9) does not hold for t =0because employment in the traded good sector is prede-
termined then.













KT ,t =0 ,1,..... (8.10)








KN ,t =0 ,1,.... . (8.11)
Equation (4.2) with money market clearing condition (i.e., the wage bill equals deposits plus
new money injections) implies, after scaling by the money stock:
ptp
T
t ct =( 1+xt),t =0 ,1,.... . (8.12)
The condition that total money spend on consumption goods is equal to the wage bill plus
money allocated by households to consumption goods implies:
ptct =( 1− α)
pN
t
















,t =0 ,1,.... . (8.13)


























t+1,t =0 ,1,.... . (8.15)















,t =0 ,1,.... . (8.16)














The 17th equation is the ﬁnal good production function, (4.4).
8.2. Steady State
The algorithm requires computing the new steady state conditional on a speciﬁed value of the

















































p =( 1− α)p
N cN
RLN (8.23)






w h i c hs a y st h a tn e te x p o r t sm u s te q u a lt h ei n t e r e s to nt h ei n t e r n a t i o n a ld e b t .
The endogenous variables here are the following seven: LN,L T,p N,z ,q T,q N, and R. The
seven equations, (8.18)-(8.24), can be used to solve for these variables (the variables, cN,y T
and V are solved using the relevant production functions). The steady state value of pT
t can
computed using (4.12) in steady state.
8.3. Backward Recursion
We now discuss how prices and quantities are computed based on a given set of sequences, λ0,
λ1,..., λT and x0,x 1,..., xT and Bs. We solve the equilibrium conditions recursively, beginning
with the new steady state and working backwards. We start the backward iteration in period
T, when pT
t for t = T and all other variables dated T +1and later are assumed to be in the new
steady state. The calculations are done in two steps. First, we proceed for t = T, T − 1,...., 1.
After that, we consider the variables in t =0 .
It is convenient to substitute out for pt from (8.17) into (8.12), (8.13), (8.4), and (8.16).





















t−1,R t,z t, Λt,d t,y
T
t .





t .T h e n , cN
t is computed from (8.5) and ct is computed from (4.4). The
variable, pN
t is computed using (8.6) with pt replaced with (8.17). The variables, zt,L T
t , and
yT
t are computed using (8.7), (8.8) and (8.9). We computed Λt using (8.3). We then computed
39pT
t−1 using (8.4) and the interest rate, Rt, using (8.1). The variables, VMPT
k,t and VMPN
k,t are
computed using (8.10) and (8.11). The variable, dt, is computed using (8.13). Then, (8.14) and
(8.15) are solved for the asset prices, qT
t and qN
t . We adjust LN
t and cT
t until equation (8.12) and
(8.16) are satisﬁed. We proceed sequentially, for t = T, T − 1,..., 1.
We now consider t =0 . Relative to the previous list of unknowns, we drop 4 variables: pT
−1,
Λ0,L T
0,d 0. We drop Λ0 because (8.3) is only satisﬁed for t =1 ,2,... .W ed r o pLT
0 because this

















0 ,R 0,z 0,y
T
0 .
We reduce these equations to two equations in two unknowns, LN
0 and cT




We obtain the values of cN
0 and c0 from (8.5) and (4.4) as before. The variable, pN
0 is
computed using (8.6) with p0 replaced with (8.17). The variables, z0, and yT
0 are computed
using (8.7) and (8.8). We use (8.13) to compute R0. We then obtain VMPT
k,0 and VMPN
k,0 from
equations (8.10) and (8.11). Asset prices, qN
0 and qT
0 , are found using (8.14) and (8.15). Finally,
LN
0 and cT
0 are adjusted until (8.12) and (8.16) are satisﬁed for t =0 .








t = −(Bt+1 − Bt),t =0 ,1,..... (8.25)
for the given value of B0. Adjust Bs until BT+1 = Bs.




























for t =0 ,1,...T. Evidently, the strategy we use to solve the model involves solving T +1
complementary slackness conditions in T +1non-negative multipliers. We used the algorithm
and code in Miranda and Fackler (2002) to do this.
8.4. Optimal Monetary Policy
To solve for the optimal monetary policy, we search over sequences of xt’s, t ≥ 0. In principle
this is a impractially high-dimensional space. We reduced the dimension of this space by making
x0,x 1 and x2 free parameters. We impose that the optimal monetary policy involves setting xt
for t ≥ 3 to a value slightly above the one implied by the Friedman rule, x = β − 1+ε, where
40ε =0 .0037. Figure 7 indicates that the system has roughly converged into the new steady state
by period 2, suggesting that our assumption that the optimal xt has converged to its steady
state by period 3 is not a problem.
To ﬁnd the optimal policy, we seached for x0,x 1, and x2 on a sequence of grids. The ﬁrst
grid is a coarse one:
χ
0
t =( −1,−0.8,−0.6,−0.4,−0.2,0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8,1), for t =0 ,1,2.








computed a second grid of 1331 points around (x1
0,x 1
1,x 1




































2). An e wg r i d ,χ2
t, of points was constructed as for χ1
t, except we did so around the
point, x2




The best point on this grid is our estimate of the globally optimal monetary policy. The money
growth rates associated with the optimal policy computed in this way are x0 = −0.27,x 1 =0 .7,
x2 = −0.03. Also, xt = −0.02, for t>2.






















Figure 1Intermediate Goods Import vs. GDP
(Index 1995 = 100)

































































































































































































Figure 3: Exports and Imports























































Figure  4 
f(λ;τ) = τ







τ2 > τ1 
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Associated with Various Tax Rates




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: (i) dimensions on vertical axes same as for Figure 7. (ii) Korean data are detrended (and seasonally adjusted where
necessary) and taken from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics.